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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – WARRANTLESS SEARCHES – 
WHETHER THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST 
EXCEPTION SHOULD APPLY TO DATA STORED ON 
CELLULAR PHONES 
Jeremy Ray* 
United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013)1 
 
I. FACTS 
 In 2008, Defendant Brima Wurie was charged with distributing 
crack cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, possession with intent to 
distribute, and felony possession of a firearm and ammunition.2  
During booking, police inventoried Wurie’s personal property, 
including two cellular phones.3  Officers of the Drug Control Unit 
examined one of the seized cell phones shortly after Wurie was 
brought to the police station.4  The officers used information contained 
on Wurie’s cell phone to determine his place of residence, eventually 
using this information to obtain and execute a search warrant.5  The 
police seized crack cocaine and illegal weapons during this search.6  
Wurie contends that the police obtained this evidence illegally, and 
therefore the court should suppress it.7 
 The lower court denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress, 
failing to distinguish the “warrantless search of a cell phone from the 
search of other types of personal containers found on a defendant’s 
person that fall within . . . the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness 
requirements.”8  The Defendant was found guilty of felony possession 
of a firearm and ammunition, possession of crack cocaine with intent 
to distribute, and distribution of crack cocaine.9  Wurrie appealed the 
suppression issue to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.10  The proper 
standard of review for a denial of a motion to suppress is clear error 
                                                 
 
* Candidate for J.D., Class of 2015, the University of Tennessee College of Law. 
1 United States v. Wurie (Wurie I), 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013). 
2 United States v. Wurie (Wurie II), 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 105 (D. Mass. 2009). 
3 Id. at 105. 
4 Id. at 106. 
5 Id. at 106-07. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 105. 
8 Id. at 110. 
9  United States v. Wurie (Wurie I), 728 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2013). 
10 Id. at 1. 
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for the factual findings and de novo for the conclusions of law.11  The 
appellate court reversed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, 
vacated his conviction, and remanded his case to the district court.12 
 
II. ISSUES 
 The Bill of Rights enumerates certain freedoms that are 
fundamental to justice, which set limits on government actions 
regarding personal liberties.13  The Fourth Amendment provides 
protection from unwarranted searches and seizures, specifically 
providing: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
[w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.14 
 
Here, the Police obtained the seized evidence unlawfully and 
unreasonably, contrary to the Constitution of the United States, and 
violated Wurie’s expectation of privacy.  
The Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches are 
presumptively unreasonable absent “one of the narrow and well-
delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement . . . .”15  For example, 
a search incident to arrest is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
requirement that officers obtain a warrant before performing a 
search.16  Although it is not unreasonable for police to search any 
container or article in a defendant’s possession during standard 
booking procedures,17 arguably that search should not extend to a 
defendant’s cell phone. 
                                                 
 
11 United States v. Richardson, 385 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2004). 
12 Wurie I, 728 F.3d at 14. 
13 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
14 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
15 Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).  
16 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973) (recognizing the need to 
protect officers and preserve evidence for later use at trial). 
17 Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983). 
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 The single-purpose container exception is another narrow 
exception to the warrant requirement.18  This exception states that an 
individual cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy for a 
container in which the contents are evident by its external 
appearance.19  Because its content is not clear by its external 
appearance, a cell phone fails to satisfy this definition.  Thus, the 
owner may have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the 
phone’s content.  Therefore, the district court should have suppressed 
the evidence because the search and seizure did not satisfy one of the 
narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement.   
 
III. ANALYSIS & RAMIFICATIONS 
 A normal incident of custodial arrest justified the possession of 
Wurie’s cell phone.20  However, the warrantless search of the content 
of Wurie’s cell phone violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and the 
court should not have admitted the seized evidence.  Thus, the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals appropriately held that the district court erred 
in ruling that an inspection of a cell phone’s content satisfied the 
requirements of a search incident to arrest because Wurie had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy for his phone’s content.21  
 Regarding this issue, some argue that “the Supreme Court and 
legislatures should . . . scale back the ability of law enforcement to 
search digital devices incident to arrest.”22  In fact, some “lower courts 
have incorrectly applied the search incident to arrest exception and 
prior Supreme Court precedent . . . .” to authorize cell phone 
searches.23  Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused 
to recognize a distinction between searching physical containers and 
searching electronic equipment for digital information.24  
From a defendant’s point of view, one obvious way to prevent 
access to potentially incriminating information contained on a cell 
                                                 
 
18 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (holding the single-purpose 
container exception allows officers to bypass the warrant requirement when the 
distinctive nature of the container makes the container’s contents a foregone 
conclusion); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (1979). 
19 Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764 n.13. 
20 See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805 (1974). 
21 United States v. Wurie (Wurie I), 728 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2013).  
22 Adam M. Gershowitz, Password Protected? Can a Password Save Your Cell 
Phone from a Search Incident to Arrest?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1175 (2011). 
23 Chelsea Oxton, The Search Incident to Arrest Exception Plays Catch Up: Why 
Police May No Longer Search Cell Phones Incident to Arrest Without a Warrant, 43 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1157, 1158 (2010). 
24 United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007). 
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phone is password protection; however, password protection alone 
may not entirely prevent police access.25  Because law enforcement 
officials are increasingly tech-savvy, officers may have the time and 
ability to bypass password protection.26   
Additionally, courts may face a number of other issues related 
to cell phone usage, admissible searches, and law enforcement 
intrusion in the future.  For example, the court may need to address 
whether one who uses a built-in remote access application to wipe a 
phone’s content clean is tampering with evidence.  Further, 
applications now exist that erase a phone’s content when a person 
enters a specific password, or if a person enters a certain number of 
incorrect passwords.  If prompted to give the phone’s password, the 
detainee could give the predetermined password to officers, 
eliminating the content upon entry of the password.  Would this 
qualify as tampering with evidence?   
Appropriately, there is no policy that allows officers to search 
the cell phones of arrestees for their own amusement.  However, this is 
precisely what happened to Nathan Newhard when he was arrested for 
driving while intoxicated.27  The police conducted a search incident to 
arrest and found a cell phone.28  One officer viewed the phone’s 
content, discovering pictures of Newhard and his former girlfriend in 
“sexually compromising positions.”29  Worse still, the officer shared 
these pictures with others at the police station, causing Newhard both 
personal and professional harm.30  While this example is extreme, the 
situation illustrates what can happen when society devalues an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The use of cell phones in today’s society is pervasive.  The 
time when cell phones were simply a small, portable way of making a 
call has long passed.  For example, cell phones now function as 
calculators, cameras, flashlights, GPSs, and watches.  Additionally, 
and more significantly, smart phones allow the exchange of 
documents, pictures, videos, text messages, and emails at the touch of 
                                                 
 
25 Gershowitz, supra note 22, at 1175 (recognizing that “computer-savvy officers” at 
the police station may have the time and technology to unlock a phone’s contents). 
26 Id.  
27 Newhard v. Borders, 649 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (W.D. Va. 2009). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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a button.31  In fact, nearly fifty-six percent of American adults now 
own a smart phone of some kind.32  Based on these facts, it seems 
obvious that a person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his or her phone’s content.  A court should not determine that the 
search of this content is permissible incident to a valid arrest merely 
because an individual is in custody.  Instead, courts should require a 
warrant from a neutral magistrate before officers may rummage 
through an individual’s cellular device.  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court must decide the validity of 
warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest.  Consequently, 
the First Circuit denied rehearing en banc to hurry this issue to the 
Supreme Court.33  Similarly, though factually distinct, a case has been 
brought before the Court asking “[w]hether or under what 
circumstances the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to 
conduct a warrantless search of the digital contents of an individual’s 
cell phone seized from the person at the time of arrest.”34  The 
Supreme Court, in making this decision, will have to balance 
individuals’ reasonable privacy interests with the potential usefulness 
of such information by law enforcement.  I believe the Supreme Court 
will eventually decide that the warrantless search of a cell phone 
incident to arrest is indeed intrusive, requiring the approval of a neutral 
magistrate. 
 
The Supreme Court, subsequent to the completion of this article but 
before publication, issued an opinion concerning this case.  Chief 
Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court stating: 
 
Modern cell phones are not just another technological 
convenience. With all they contain and all they may 
reveal, they hold for many Americans “the privacies of 
life[.]” The fact that technology now allows an 
individual to carry such information in his hand does 
not make the information any less worthy of the 
protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer 
to the question of what police must do before searching 
                                                 
 
31 Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 27, 41-42 (2008). 
32 AARON SMITH, SMARTPHONE OWNERSHIP—2013 UPDATE 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-
media//Files/Reports/2013/PIP_Smartphone_adoption_2013_PDF.pdf. 
33 United States v. Wurie (Wurie III), 724 F.3d 255, 255 (1st Cir. 2013). 
34 Brief for Petitioner at i, Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (No. 13-132), 
2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3082. 
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a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly 
simple — get a warrant.35 
 
This quote from the Chief Justice echoes the premise of the 
article.  We should not forfeit individual liberties when such a 
simple solution exists – “get a warrant.”36  
 
                                                 
 
35 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494-95 (2014) (citation omitted). 
36 Id.  
